Episode 76: Tara Leigh Grove
Reports of the pod’s death are greatly exaggerated, dear listeners. Despite the lengthy hiatus, we’re finally back with a terrific episode on judicial method, judicial power, and much more. To kick off the Spring installment of the pod, we’re incredibly fortunate to be joined by Tara Leigh Grove, the Vinson & Elkins Chair in Law at the University of Texas at Austin School of Law, who comes on the pod to discuss her article, “The Power to Impose Method,” forthcoming in the Yale Law Journal.
The episode begins with a general discussion about the Supreme Court’s power to impose an interpretive methodology on lower courts, what is often called “methodological stare decisis.” Grove advocates for something resembling a middle ground—the Supreme Court has a limited, bounded power to impose method on lower courts. We then get into the nitty gritty of the distinction between holding and dictum and of Article III’s case and controversy requirement. David asks why the Supreme Court can’t just do what it wants regarding method, and he queries whether the Supreme Court also has power to narrow the precedential force of its interpretive holdings. Sam asks why we should care whether the Supreme Court could impose method in one fell swoop if it’s clear that it can impose method in a piecemeal, case-by-case fashion. We conclude our discussion of Grove’s article by debating the normative credentials of interpretive pluralism.
Before wrapping up the pod, we launch a brand new featured segment on The Canon of American Legal Thought, where we ask guests for (at least) one nomination for a list of the most important legal scholarship of the last fifty years. Grove offers not one, but three, excellent nominations, and Sam and David resist the urge to nominate their own work. We hope you enjoy!
This podcast is generously supported by Themis Bar Review.
Referenced Readings
“The Power to Impose Method”, by Tara Grove
A Running List of Nominations for the Canon of American Legal Thought (1975-2025)
A Matter of Interpretation, by Antonin Scalia [Grove]
“A Neo-Federalist View of Article III”, by Akhil Reed Amar [Grove]
“The Anticanon”, by Jamal Greene [Grove]
H.L.A. Hart’s “no vehicles in the park” hypothetical has been described as “the most famous hypothetical in the common law world.” In the spirit of this episode, give us your hottest take on this chestnut of statutory interpretation. Are airplanes vehicles? Tricycles?
Sam: Anything is a vehicle that an adequately powerful consensus decides is one. Do the math.
David: As is often the case, the fight over legal interpretation missed the big policy change – many parks closing their internal roads to cars, leaving more space for bikes and runners alike. The closing of Central Park to cars (other than the separated cross-town thoroughfares) is a huge policy success, and far more important than edge cases about motorized scooters.